Failure to Hire DOT Driver After Positive Drug Test Result Leads To ADA Claim

A South Carolina company that hauls gasoline, diesel fuel and ethanol throughout the country will face an Americans with Disabilities Act suit brought by a rejected DOT driver applicant with a sleep disorder for which he was prescribed an amphetamine (Dexedrine), the U.S. Court of Appeals in Richmond has decided, reversing a lower’s court’s dismissal of John Lisotto’s lawsuit.  Lisotto v. New Prime, Inc.,   2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 8011 (4th Cir., No. 15-1273, decided May 3, 2016) (not officially reported).

A district court concluded that Lisotto had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies before the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration and threw out his discrimination complaint.  However, the appeals court found the lower court had mischaracterized the issue as a conflict between physicians  over Lisotto’s physical qualifications to be a driver, for which FMCSA regulations provide administrative recourse (49 C.F.R. § 391.47 authorizes  the FMCSA to resolve “conflicts of medical evaluation” where the physician for the driver and the physician for the motor carrier disagree concerning a driver’s physical qualifications.)

That was not the case, the Fourth Circuit concluded.  There was no such disagreement.  As long as Lisotto took proper medication for his narcolepsy, he appeared to be qualified, according to the doctors.  Rather, the facts alleged here focused on the refusal to hire Lisotto based on his positive pre-employment drug test result and the company’s medical review officer’s actions in regard to that test result.  Specifically, the medical review officer allegedly did not communicate with Lisotto’s physician to determine whether there was a legitimate medical reason to explain the positive drug test result.  The Fourth Circuit concluded Lisotto’s complaint could “only be read to lodge an ADA claim” against the company based on alleged conduct leading up to its failure to hire him, and by its failure to hire him, even though he had provided documentation that his narcolepsy had been controlled by medications.  Lisotto’s complaint also alleged the company violated the ADA:  by failing to hire him because he tested positive for amphetamines on a FMCSA-required pre-employment drug test; by failing to accept his doctor’s explanation for his positive drug test result; by failing to proceed with the hiring process in light of information provided by his doctor and insisting that he change medications; by reporting a positive drug test result; and, by failing to correct the false drug test report made to FMCSA, DOT or others. The Fourth Circuit remanded the case for further proceedings.

A prospective employer’s alleged failure to address an applicant’s lawfully prescribed medications that control his medical condition, consistent with DOT and FMCSA regulations, may result in ADA claims. Under DOT regulations, carriers may be held responsible for the regulatory compliance by their service providers, such as MROs, even though they are independent contractors.

What OSHA’s Electronic Recordkeeping Rule Means For Workplace Post-Accident Drug and Alcohol Testing

Today, OSHA’s final electronic recordkeeping rule, “Improve Tracking of Workplace Injuries and Illnesses,” was published in the Federal Register.  A detailed discussion of the rule can be found here on our OSHA Law Blog.  In the final rule OSHA states that “blanket post-injury drug testing policies deter proper reporting” and concludes that:

the final rule does prohibit employers from using drug testing (or the threat of drug testing) as a form of adverse action against employees who report injuries or illnesses. To strike the appropriate balance here, drug testing policies should limit post-incident testing to situations in which employee drug use is likely to have contributed to the incident, and for which the drug test can accurately identify impairment caused by drug use.  For example, it would likely not be reasonable to drug-test an employee who reports a bee sting, a repetitive strain injury, or an injury caused by a lack of machine guarding or a machine or tool malfunction.  Such a policy is likely only to deter reporting without contributing to the employer’s understanding of why the injury occurred, or in any other way contributing to workplace safety.  Employers need not specifically suspect drug use before testing, but there should be a reasonable possibility that drug use by the reporting employee was a contributing factor to the reported injury or illness in order for an employer to require drug testing.  In addition, drug testing that is designed in a way that may be perceived as punitive or embarrassing to the employee is likely to deter injury reporting.”

(Emphasis added).  The OSHA rule has no impact on post-accident testing mandated by federal regulations or permitted by state workers’ compensation laws (e.g., premium reduction laws).  The rule states that “[i]f an employer conducts drug testing to comply with the requirements of a state or federal law or regulation, the employer’s motive would not be retaliatory and the final rule would not prohibit such testing.”  However, post-accident drug and alcohol testing is unregulated in many states.

Numerous questions about post-accident drug and alcohol testing are raised by the OSHA rule. For example:

  • While OSHA states that “reasonable suspicion” is not required for post-accident testing, it is not clear what OSHA means by stating that there should be a “reasonable possibility” that drug use was a “contributing factor” to the reported injury or illness.
  • It is unclear what OSHA means by “the drug test can accurately identify impairment caused by drug use.” In general, urine drug tests detect whether an individual has used drugs in the last 2 to 4 days.
  • OSHA states drug testing “that is designed in a way that may be perceived as punitive” may deter reporting of injuries. But how can an employer determine in advance the subjective perception of an employee to a particular drug test, and is this a valid standard in any case? Further, it may invite abuse to frustrate lawful testing: employees who know they are going to test positive may object to a post-accident drug test as “punitive” even if it is part of a well-designed drug and alcohol testing program that is intended to promote workplace safety.

OSHA intends to issue additional guidance concerning the new rule. Legal challenges to the rule also are anticipated.

In the interim, employers who conduct post-accident drug and/or alcohol testing should review their policies to ensure that they are not conducting overly broad “automatic” post-injury testing that could be viewed as a deterrent to injury reporting by employees. This is particularly true for injuries and illnesses that appear to have no plausible connection to drug or alcohol abuse, such as, for example: allergic reactions, animal or insect bites, back or muscle strains caused by overexertion, carpal tunnel syndrome, and diabetic episodes, among other things.

Due to the unsettled nature of the questions raised by the OSHA rule, employers who conduct post-accident drug and alcohol testing should follow this issue closely and should consult with counsel to determine whether their post-accident drug and alcohol testing programs comply with all applicable laws.

Pennsylvania Employee Proceeds With Invasion of Privacy Claim Arising Out Of Positive Drug Test Result

A federal court in Pennsylvania has allowed an employee to proceed with a wrongful discharge/invasion of privacy claim related to her discharge after a positive drug test result. Wilkinson v. Marvin E. Klinger, Inc., Case No. 4:15-cv-01916, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58340 (M.D. PA. May 3, 2016).

Plaintiff, a 58-year old school bus driver, was terminated after taking a random drug test pursuant to her employer’s written policy and testing positive for opiates (including codeine). Plaintiff alleged that she was prescribed medications containing opiates and/or codeine due to migraines and sciatica.  She asserted claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, and wrongful discharge/invasion of privacy.  She argued that her termination raised public policy implications because she was “fired for taking legally prescribed narcotics for legitimate medical reasons.”

The employer’s drug testing policy prohibited the use of illegal drugs or legal drugs that could impact the employee’s ability to perform the job safely. The drug testing procedures included review of all positive drug test results by a Medical Review Officer to determine whether the positive test result was caused by lawful prescription drug use.

When the employer moved to dismissed the complaint, the Court dismissed the age discrimination claim, but allowed Plaintiff to proceed with all of her other claims. With regard to the wrongful discharge/invasion of privacy claim, Plaintiff relied on Borse v. Piece Goods Shop, Inc. 963 F.3d 611 (3d Cir. 1992), arguing that there were public policy implications arising from her discharge because she alleged she was fired for taking legal prescriptions medications for legitimate medical reasons.  In Borse, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that terminating an employee for refusing to consent to a drug test may violate Pennsylvania’s public policy against tortious invasion of privacy.  The court adopted a test for tortious invasion of privacy wrongful discharge claims, requiring the balancing of “the employee’s privacy interest against the employer’s interest in maintaining a drug-free workplace in order to determine whether a reasonable person would find the employer’s program highly offensive.”

The employer argued that Plaintiff could not maintain an invasion of privacy or wrongful discharge claim because she consented to the drug test. However, the Court allowed the claim to proceed and stated that Plaintiff was entitled to obtain discovery on the drug and alcohol policy and its implementation so the Court could properly conduct a “fact-intensive analysis” and balancing test to determine whether the employer’s drug policy was intrusive on her seclusion or invaded her privacy.

Pennsylvania Enacts Medical Marijuana Law

Pennsylvania Governor Tom Wolf signed legislation that legalizes the use of marijuana for medicinal uses on April 17, 2016. The new law, Senate Bill 3, known as “The Medical Marijuana Act” permits patients suffering from ALS, autism, cancer, Crohn’s disease, nerve damage, epilepsy, glaucoma, HIV/AIDS, Huntington’s Disease, inflammatory bowel syndrome, intractable seizures, multiple sclerosis, Parkinson’s disease, post-traumatic stress disorder, severe chronic or intractable pain and sickle cell anemia to use marijuana for medicinal use.  Medical marijuana only may be dispensed in the following forms:  pill, oil, topical forms (including gel, creams or ointments), vaporization or nebulization, tincture or liquid. Smoking marijuana is not permitted under the law.

Although the law takes effect in thirty days, the Department of Health must promulgate rules and regulations for the establishment and operation of marijuana dispensaries as well as the patient registration process and issuance of identification cards to patients and caregivers. The implementation of the program is expected to take between 18 and 24 months.

There are several provisions in The Medical Marijuana Act that impact employers. First, there is a broad anti-discrimination provision:

No employer may discharge, threaten, refuse to hire or otherwise discriminate or retaliate against an employee regarding an employee’s compensation, terms, conditions, location or privileges solely on the basis of such employee’s status as an individual who is certified to use medical marijuana.

However, employers need not accommodate the use of marijuana at work, and may discipline employees who are “under the influence” of marijuana at work:

Nothing in this Act shall require an employer to make an accommodation of the use of medical marijuana on the property or premises of any place of employment. This Act shall in no way limit an employer’s ability to discipline an employee for being under the influence of medical marijuana in the workplace or for working while under the influence of medical marijuana when the employee’s conduct falls below the standard of care normally accepted for that position.

Nothing in this Act shall require an employer to commit an act that would put the employer or any person acting on its behalf in violation of federal law.

Additionally, the law prohibits the following in certain safety-sensitive jobs:

A patient may not operate or be in physical control of any of the following while under the influence with a blood content of more than 10 ng/ml: (1) chemicals which require a permit issued by the federal government, state government, federal agency or state agency; or (2) high-voltage electricity or any other public utility.

A patient may not perform any employment duties at heights or in confined spaces, including, but not limited to, mining while under the influence of medical marijuana.

A patient may be prohibited by an employer from performing any task which the employer deems life-threatening, to either the employee or any of the employees of the employer, while under the influence of marijuana. The prohibition shall not be deemed an adverse employment decision even if the prohibition results in financial harm for the patient.

A patient may be prohibited by an employer from performing any duty which could result in a public health or safety risk while under the influence of medical marijuana. The prohibition shall not be deemed an adverse employment decision even if the prohibition results in financial harm for the patient.

While these provisions appear to benefit employers who operate safety-sensitive workplaces, they also raise a number of questions which are not answered by the statute, including, what is the definition of “under the influence of marijuana”? While most employers rely on urine testing for drugs, the active ingredient in marijuana still can show on a urine drug test days or even weeks after use (depending on the frequency of use).

Employers with operations in Pennsylvania should review their drug and alcohol policies and consult with counsel to determine how they will address these issues once the law goes into effect.

Three-Year Statute of Limitations Applies To Violations of Rhode Island Drug Testing Law

The Rhode Island Supreme Court has held that a three-year statute of limitations applies to claims alleging violations of the employer drug testing statute in that state. Goddard v. APG Sec.-RI, LLC, No. 2014-239-Appeal (R.I. Mar. 7, 2016).

Rhode Island’s employer drug testing statute provides employees with a right to be free from drug tests that are not administered in accordance with the process set forth in the statute. R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 28-6.5-1 to 28-6.5-2.  The law sets out several conditions under which an employer may subject an employee to drug testing.  It also provides that violations of the statute can lead to a misdemeanor conviction of the employer as well as an award of punitive damages, attorneys’ fees, costs and injunctive relief in favor of an employee in a civil action against an employer.  However, the law does not set forth a statute of limitations.

Rejecting the Plaintiff’s arguments that a ten-year statute of limitations should apply for violations of the drug testing law, the Court held that the three-year statute of limitations applicable to “injuries to the person” applies. The Court explained that violations of the drug testing law are analogous to an invasion of privacy and should be subject to the shorter limitations period that applies to other employment-related claims.

Minnesota Drug Testing Law Applies Where Minnesota Resident Was Hired to Work in Another State

A federal appeals court in Minnesota has held that the Minnesota drug testing statute applies to an applicant tested in Minnesota, even though the applicant was being hired for a job in another state.  Olson v. Push, Inc., No. 14-3160 (8th Cir. Feb. 22, 2016).

Push, Inc., a Wisconsin corporation, hired Olson, a Minnesota resident, for a job in West Virginia.  Olson accepted the job and underwent a pre-employment drug test in Minnesota.  He started working in West Virginia three days later.  When the drug test result came back as “dilute” five days later, Push treated it as a positive result and terminated Olson’s employment.

Olson filed suit in Minnesota, alleging violation of The Minnesota Drug and Alcohol Testing in the Workplace Act (“DATWA”), which prohibits an employer from terminating an employee for a first-time positive drug test result.  Given that Olson had already commenced working, he was no longer an applicant.  The law defines “employer” as “a person or entity located or doing business in [Minnesota] and having one or more employees.”

Push removed the action to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction.  Although Push conceded that it was “doing business” in Minnesota, the district court dismissed the complaint because it interpreted “doing business” under DATWA to mean “relevant business—namely, the employment for which [the entity] is conducting drug testing” and therefore DATWA did not apply.

The Eight Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, finding that:

DATWA contains no language limiting its application only to drug testing of those employees whoseemployment is directly related to an employer’s Minnesota business activities; rather, the legislature drafted DATWA broadly to encompass all employers that are located in Minnesota, and all employers that conduct business in Minnesota.  We also note that the Supreme Court of Minnesota would not read into a statute a requirement that the legislature has purposely or inadvertently omitted; thus, contrary to the district court’s interpretation, we decline to read into DATWA’s statutory definition of “employer” a requirement that there be a nexus between the drug testing and “relevant business.”

The Court further explained that “a broad construction of ‘employer’ is eminently compatible with DATWA’s purpose, which is to provide employees additional protections in relation to employer-requested drug and alcohol testing.  Moreover, in any case, the definition of “employer” is constrained by the bounds of due process.  In order for a state’s substantive law to be constitutionally applied in a particular case, the state must have a significant contact or a significant aggregation of contacts with the parties or the underlying facts giving rise to the litigation, creating a state interest, such that the application of its law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair.  In sum, the Court held that DATWA applied to this case because Push did business in Minnesota, hired a Minnesota resident and permitted the pre-employment drug test to be conducted in Minnesota.

Employers doing business in Minnesota and conducting drug testing in Minnesota should take note.  This case also highlights the importance of waiting for receipt of the pre-employment drug test result before permitting an applicant to begin working.

Employee’s ADA Claim Advanced Due To Supervisor’s Alleged Demand That Employee Admit To Substance Abuse Problem

An employee who was allegedly fired for refusing to admit he had a substance abuse problem presented sufficient evidence to advance his claim under the “regarded as” prong of the Americans with Disabilities Act, according to a Massachusetts federal court. The employer denied terminating the employee or demanding that he admit having a substance abuse problem.  The Court granted summary judgment on the employee’s Massachusetts anti-discrimination law claim, applying pre-ADA amendment case law, but denied summary judgment on the ADA claim. Izzo v. Genesco, Inc. d/b/a LIDS, Case No. 14-cv-13607-ADB (D. Mass. Mar. 22, 2016).

Plaintiff was hired in 2006 and was promoted several times before becoming manager of the employer’s Braintree, MA. store. During 2012, the Braintree store performed poorly, as evidenced by flagging sales. Plaintiff alleged that during a store visit in August 2012, his supervisor demanded that Plaintiff admit to having a substance abuse problem.  Plaintiff further alleged his supervisor told him he would be terminated if he did not admit to abusing drugs.  When Plaintiff refused to comply with the direction, the supervisor allegedly followed through on the threat and terminated him.

Defendant disputed Plaintiff’s account, and maintained Plaintiff had resigned. Plaintiff’s supervisor testified that he was concerned about Plaintiff and tried to determine if Plaintiff was experiencing personal problems.  The supervisor claimed he reminded Plaintiff about the company’s Employee Assistance Program (EAP) that offered treatment programs for drugs and alcohol.  The supervisor also testified that he offered Plaintiff a leave of absence.  According to the supervisor, Plaintiff put down his keys and walked out.  The supervisor’s account was supported by a phone log memorializing a conversation between the supervisor and the Human Resources Department the day of the incident, as well as testimony of another store manager.

Alcoholism is covered under the ADA, regardless of whether the employee is a recovering alcoholic or a current user. However, the same is not true for illegal drug users.  Employees who are “currently engaging in the illegal use of drugs” are not covered under the ADA.  On the other hand, recovering addicts who are not currently engaging in illegal drug use may be covered.  The ADA also protects employees who are not engaging in the illegal use of drugs but are “erroneously regarded” as doing so.

The Court denied Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s ADA claim. The Court found Plaintiff satisfied his prima facie case, because there were factual disputes as to whether Plaintiff’s supervisor erroneously perceived him as a current drug user and whether Plaintiff was terminated or resigned.  Defendant argued summary judgment was still appropriate based on Plaintiff’s poor performance.  The Court disagreed, stating, “Though it is undisputed that [Plaintiff’s] work performance was lacking…it is disputed whether this was the reason he was let go.”

This case serves as a reminder that employers must tread carefully when addressing suspected employee substance abuse, as the ADA’s protection in this area is expansive.

Lack of Clarity in Employer’s Drug Testing Policy Results in Remand to Trial Court in Unemployment Compensation Case

Although an employee clearly refused a drug test under an employer’s drug and alcohol policy, an appellate court in Alabama remanded the case to the trial court because the employer’s policy did not clearly define the testing methods to be utilized, which was an important component of determining the employee’s eligibility for unemployment benefits. Austal USA, LLC v. Ala. Dep’t of Lab., No. CV-15-900034 (Ala. Civ. App. Mar. 18, 2016).

Kenneth Johnson was employed as an electrician by Austal USA, LLC, which builds ships for the U.S. Navy. Pursuant to Austal’s “Drugs and Alcohol Zero Tolerance Policy,” Johnson was selected for a random drug test.  The drug policy provided that refusing to test will lead to immediate termination.  Johnson’s initial drug screen, conducted on the Company’s premises, was positive for amphetamines and methamphetamines. Austal immediately offered Johnson a second test, provided at the company’s own expense, at an outside medical clinic.  Johnson refused and was terminated.

Johnson filed for unemployment benefits, which the Department of Labor initially approved. Austal appealed and the Department of Labor’s decision was affirmed.  Austal then filed suit in court and a trial court granted the Department of Labor’s summary judgment motion.  The trial court relied on the uncontested fact that Johnson’s failed initial test did not comply with U.S. Department of Transportation regulations.  Under Alabama Civil Regulations, “refusal to submit to or cooperate with a blood or urine test after previous warning” may result in disqualification of unemployment compensation if that test is DOT-compliant (or the employer utilizes other reliable testing standards).

On appeal, the Department of Labor argued that there must be a confirmed positive test result in order for an employee to be disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits. Austal argued that Johnson was terminated because he refused the second drug test, and the Court of Civil Appeals noted that Johnson received the employer’s drug policy which warned him that refusing a drug test would lead to termination.  Because the record was clear that Johnson failed to cooperate with the second drug test and was aware that it would result in his termination, the trial court erred by granting the Department of Labor’s motion for summary judgment.

However, the Court of Civil Appeals remanded for further litigation regarding the procedure to be followed for the second test. Despite testimony from an Austal manager that second tests are administered pursuant to DOT regulations, the employer’s Policy “[was] completely devoid of an established procedure for the physical administration of a drug test.”  Specifically, the policy did not mention that employees would be required to submit to a second test after an initial on-site positive test result, and the policy further did not clarify whether the second test was performed on the original specimen or on a new specimen.  This lack of clarity required remand to the trial court to determine whether the refused test complied with DOT standards or was “otherwise reliable.”

This case highlights one of the many reasons why employers should have clear, detailed drug and alcohol testing policies, including a description of the testing methods to be followed. When a testing policy is silent or vague on a particular issue, a court is likely to refer the issue to the finder of fact.

U.S. Supreme Court Denies Permission For Lawsuit Seeking to Invalidate Colorado’s Legalization Of Marijuana

The U.S. Supreme Court denied a motion filed by the states of Nebraska and Oklahoma for leave to file a complaint against the state of Colorado, challenging that State’s legalization of marijuana. The Supreme Court denied the motion without opinion or explanation on March 21, 2016.

In December 2014, Nebraska and Oklahoma moved for leave to file a complaint against Colorado, arguing that Colorado’s legalization of marijuana was unconstitutional. They contended, among other things, that the state’s marijuana legalization program violated the federal Controlled Substances Act, which makes the cultivation, trafficking and possession of marijuana unlawful and that federal law is controlling under the U.S. Constitution.  They further argued that Colorado’s “legal” marijuana flowed into their neighboring states, creating a variety of law enforcement problems.  Nebraska and Oklahoma invoked a rarely used constitutional provision giving the High Court original jurisdiction over suits between states.  They sought a declaration that the Colorado legalization program was unconstitutional.

Justices Thomas and Alito filed a dissenting opinion from the denial of the motion for leave to file a complaint. Writing the dissent, Justice Thomas stated that the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over controversies between States and that federal law does not give the Court discretion to decline cases within its original jurisdiction, even though the Court has long exercised such discretion.  Finding that the Court’s discretionary approach to exercising original jurisdiction was “questionable,” and because the plaintiff States made a reasonable case that the dispute fell within the Court’s original jurisdiction, Justice Thomas stated that he would have granted the plaintiff States leave to file the complaint.

It appears, however, that litigation between these States still is possible. Nebraska Attorney General Doug Peterson stated that “the Supreme Court has not held that Colorado’s unconstitutional facilitation of marijuana industrialization is legal and the court’s decision does not bar additional challenges to Colorado’s scheme in federal district court.”

On the federal level, it is now up to Congress to decide the federal government’s position with regard to marijuana. The Compassionate Access, Research Expansion, and Respect States (CARERS) Act of 2015 – which seeks to downgrade marijuana from a Schedule I to a Schedule II drug (among other things) — has languished in committee since March 2015.


Montana’s Revised Medical Marijuana Law Survives Constitutional Challenge

The Montana Supreme Court has upheld against a state constitutional challenge the State’s 2011 Montana Marijuana Act, a new statutory framework embodying the State’s effort to limit abuses resulting from the 2004 Medical Marijuana Act, which was established by voter initiation. Montana Cannabis Industry Ass’n v. The State of Montana, 2016 Mont. LEXIS 168 (Feb. 25, 2016).  The decision could benefit employers by limiting the availability of marijuana among persons not authorized to use it for medical purposes.

Relying principally on a substantive due process analysis, the Supreme Court vacated a state district court’s injunctions against: (1) a provision in the 2011 law that requires the Department of Health and Human Resources to notify the Board of Medical Examiners of any physician who certifies 25 or more patients in a year for medical marijuana; (2) a provision limiting to three the number of registered patients providers of marijuana and marijuana-infused products can assist; and (3) a prohibition against providers advertising “marijuana or marijuana-related products in any medium, including electronic media”.  Contrary to the lower court, it found these statutory prohibitions to be constitutional on their face.

The Supreme Court, however, declared to be unconstitutional under the equal protection and due process clauses of the Montana constitution a prohibition against providers accepting remuneration for their products or services relating to medical marijuana. The statute barred providers from accepting reimbursement from a medical marijuana cardholder for more than the provider’s application or renewal fee for a registry identification card, and from accepting “anything of value, including monetary remuneration, for any services or products provided to a registered cardholder,” and from buying or selling marijuana plants or products.  The court was concerned that a complete prohibition against compensation bore no rational relationship to the Legislation’s apparent objective of preventing large-scale marijuana production operations from serving as fronts for illegal drug trafficking that could funnel money to cartels, gangs and other criminal enterprises.  Such restriction also would be “invidious,” the court found, because even when medical marijuana was approved by a physician, “it would have no commercially available source of supply.”  The court permanently enjoined enforcement of these provisions.

The State Supreme Court affirmed the lower court in upholding the facial validity of the new law’s provision prohibiting probationers from becoming registered cardholders and a provision allowing warrantless inspections of medical marijuana providers’ business by the Department and law enforcement agencies.

The court’s decision generally sustaining the revised Medical Marijuana Act’s provisions should help employers by limiting the likelihood of marijuana abuse. It bears noting that although the legality of the state law in the face of the federal Controlled Substances Act (which makes marijuana illegal as a Schedule I drug) was not before the court, the court’s opinion repeatedly referenced this “elephant in the room,” and it likely informed much of the court’s opinion.